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SUPREME COURT WATCH
RECENT DECISIONS OF SELECTED CRIMINAL CASES | MAX P. SALAZAR, JR.

FILARSKY V. DELIA
Docket Number: 10-1018
Argument: January 17, 2012
Issue:
Whether a private attorney retained to work with government employees in conducting an internal investigation is
barred from asserting qualified immunity because of his status
as a private lawyer rather than a government employee.
Facts:
Respondent Delia worked for the City of Rialto,
California’s fire department. In August 2006, he complained
that he was feeling sick and
obtained a series of letters
from his doctor that excused
him from work but not from
participating in any other activity. After the City became
suspicious and saw him buying home-renovation supplies,
the City started an internal
affairs investigation to see
if he was “off-work on false
pretenses.” The City retained
petitioner Filarsky to provide
legal analysis and assist in the
investigation. After a meeting
with Delia and a few Fire Chiefs, Filarsky advised the Chiefs
with a specific course of action. The Chiefs followed through
and decided to end the investigation after learning that Delia
had not used the home-renovation supplies.
Delia sued the City, fire department, Filarsky, and other
unidentified individuals under § 1983. The district court granted
summary judgment and held that all of the individual defendants,
including Filarsky, were entitled to qualified immunity. The
Ninth Circuit then affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court
affirmed the dismissal of all the individual government defendants while denying summary judgment to Filarsky because he
“was not entitled to qualified immunity” “as a private attorney.”
Petitioner Filarsky argues that government positions
entitled to immunity at both local and state levels have historically been filled with people working in the private and
public sectors. As a result, a person’s formal institution into
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a government position was not dispositive in determining immunity. Rather, eligibility for immunity turned on “whether the
temporarily engaged individual was the functional equivalent
of a government employee.” Thus, according to Filarsky, courts
should consider the role performed, supervision of government
officials, and “the immunity that would have attached to the
government employees performing the same essential government task.” As such, Filarsky’s main contention is that qualified
immunity should extend to lawyers working under the auspices
of government.
In contrast, Delia argues that a private individual conducting an interview is not entitled to qualified immunity under
Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997). Further, he
contends that the policy
reasons for qualified immunity would not be fulfilled if
immunity was extended to
private persons conducting
workplace investigations.
Delia also does not agree
with Filarsky’s qualified immunity test discussed above
because it is both “arbitrary
and unworkable.” Finally,
Delia points to the distinction
between private and public
lawyers; specifically, different incentives guide different
principles of action between the two. As such, Delia does not
want to extend qualified immunity to private actors.

BLUEFORD V. ARKANSAS
Docket Number: 10-1320
Argument: February 22, 2012
Issue:
Whether, if a jury deadlocks on a lesser-included offense,
the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the re-prosecution of a greater
offense after a jury announces that it is “unanimously against”
guilt on the greater offense.
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Facts:
Petitioner Blueford was charged with capital murder and
lesser-included offenses. During closing arguments, the State
urged the jury to not consider the lesser-included offenses until
they found the petitioner not guilty of first-degree murder. After
three hours of deliberation, the jury asked what would happen
if they could not agree on any charge. The judge granted a
series of dynamite instructions; despite these instructions and
two more hours of deliberation, the jury was deadlocked on
the lesser-included offense and the judge declared a mistrial.
During deliberations, however, the foreperson told the trial
judge that “the jury had voted ‘unanimous against’ capital
murder and first-degree murder but had voted 9-3 on manslaughter.” As such, petitioner Blueford moved to have the new
case brought against him for first-degree murder under a double
jeopardy theory. The Arkansas Supreme Court agreed with the
court below and held that Blueford could be tried again because
voicing jury deliberations did not terminate jeopardy.
Blueford contends that what the foreperson told the court
constituted an acquittal under Double Jeopardy jurisprudence.
As such, Blueford beseeches the Court to accept substance over
form when determining whether the acquittal represents a resolution. He further supports this assertion by noting that the “jury
instructions establish acquittals on the greater offenses by virtue
of the jury’s deadlock on the lesser-included offense.” Ultimately,
Blueford sees deliberation and unequivocal expression
of innocence by the jury as enough evidence that an acquittal
was reached; any indication otherwise would undermine the
Double Jeopardy Clause’s policy goals.
Arkansas, on the other hand, relies on Arizona v.
Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978) to conclude that a deadlocked
jury warranted a mistrial. As such, jury deliberations do not
amount to an acquittal under double jeopardy. Arkansas argues
that the court has drawn a bright line between jury verdicts and
deliberations; specifically, only the former could result in an
acquittal. Further, a jury verdict “is a resolution; it represents
juror agreement at the end of deliberations; it is unmistakably
clear when it is issued; and it ordinarily cannot be reconsidered
once it is accepted.” Finally, Arkansas does not see the jury
instructions as creating an independent mechanism for acquittal.
Therefore, Arkansas reasons that an implied acquittal does not
arise because the jurors were allowed to step down from the
different elements and charges pursuant to the jury instructions.
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UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ
Docket No. 11-210
Argument: February 22, 2012
Issue:
Whether the Stolen Valor Act, 18 U.S.C. § 704(b), which
makes it a crime to falsely represent that you have been awarded
any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the Armed
Forces of the United States, is facially invalid under the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
Facts:
On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez introduced himself as a
retired Marine who was awarded the Congressional Medal of
Honor. However, he had never served in the military and his
statement garnered no benefits. He was one of the first people
prosecuted under the Stolen Valor Act of 2005, where Congress
deemed it a crime to “falsely represent…verbally or in writing,
to have been awarded any decoration or medal authorized by
Congress for the Armed Forces of the United States.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 704(b).
Alvarez brought both a facial and as-applied challenges
to the constitutionality of the law. The district court denied
Alvarez’s motion to dismiss. He pled guilty and was sentenced
to three years probation with a $5,000 fine. The court of
appeals reversed and remanded. The court first reasoned that
what Alvarez said did not fall into the historical and traditional
categories of unprotected speech. Further, the court applied
strict scrutiny to the law and did not find it to be narrowly
tailored because “other means exist to achieve the interest of
stopping such fraud, such as by using more speech, or redrafting
the Act to target actual impersonation or fraud.”
The Government argues that the law “prohibits a discrete
and narrow category of factual statements: knowingly false
representations that a reasonable observer would understand
as a factual claim that the speaker has been awarded military
honor.” Further, the Government does not agree with the lower
court’s decision to apply strict scrutiny when dealing with false
factual statements; rather, the petitioner advocates a compelling
interest analysis. Finally, the Government argues that the statute
provides ample breathing space for protected speech.
Alvarez, on the other hand, agrees with strict scrutiny as the
standard. Further, he argues that the Government wants to create
a new standard “that would permit prosecution of lies so long
as the Government was able to conjure an ‘important’ interest,
and so long as the law leaves breathing space for fully protected
speech.” Alvarez rejects this test because it criminalizes lies and
does not see an inherent value in white lies. Further, he relies
on a public policy argument to differentiate puffery and social
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speech from harmful lies. Finally, Alvarez concludes that the
statute will not survive a constitutional challenge even if the
Government’s test was adopted.

WOOD V. MILYARD
Docket Number: 10-9995
Argument: February 27, 2012
Issues:
(1) Whether an appellate court has the authority to raise
sua sponte a 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) statute of limitations defense.
(2) Whether Colorado lost their statute of limitations defense
after telling the district court that it was not challenging the
timeliness of Wood’s petition.
Facts:
Petitioner Patrick Wood filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus on February 5, 2008. The district court denied two of his
six constitutional claims on the merits that dealt with potential
double jeopardy violations. The Tenth Circuit then granted him
a certificate of appealability, while making both parties argue
about the timeliness of Wood’s petition and state procedural
rules that would prevent the claims from going forward. The
court noted, however, that Colorado did not challenge the timeliness of Wood’s petition. Even so, the circuit court raised the
timeliness defense sua sponte and dismissed the claims.
Petitioner Wood recognizes that “affirmative defenses
based on statute of limitations must be pled, and such defenses
are forfeited or waived if not asserted in the district court.” As
such, Wood concludes that the circuit court overreached its
authority in resurrecting a claim that was not raised, and that
not raising it amounts to waiver. Further, Wood recognizes that
a district court may in some cases sua sponte raise a limitations
defense under Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 (2006), but
argues against expanding it to appellate courts. Wood explicitly
notes the different roles that appellate and district courts hold
while also recognizing that the Tenth Circuit alone allows an
appellate court to raise a timeliness defense sua sponte.
Therefore, Wood relies on policy considerations and precedent
to bar appellate courts from raising defenses without being
pleaded in the lower courts.
The respondent, on the other hand, concentrates on the
waiver issue. Specifically, Milyard construes the State’s statement as an ambiguous expression as to statute of limitations
defense. In other words, the State did not challenge nor concede
the timeliness defense, thus, it should not be construed as a
waiver. As such, Milyard also recognizes a unique quality in
habeas petitions and would afford appellate courts greater
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latitude in said proceedings. Further, Milyard’s argument rests
on the distinction between waiver and forfeiture. Thus, Milyard
does not think that what the State said at the district court
constituted an “intentional relinquishment of a known right”
and that an appellate court has the authority to raise a statute
of limitations defense sua sponte.

MOHAMAD V. PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
Docket Number: 11-88
Argument: February 28, 2012
Issue:
Whether the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, which
authorizes actions against an “individual” who commits acts of
torture, permits actions against defendants that are not natural
persons.
Facts:
Azzam Rahim, a United States immigrant from the
West Bank, was murdered in 1995 under the auspices of the
Palestinian Authority (PA). Rahim’s son, Mohamad, filed suit
against the PA in federal district court; he alleged that they were
responsible for torturing and killing his father. The district court
held that Mohamad could not sue under the Torture Victim
Protection Act because the term “individual” did not extend to
organizations. The appellate court affirmed the judgment under
a literal reading of the statute.
Petitioner Mohamad argues that the statute’s purposes
permit expansion of the term “individuals” to non-sovereign
organizations by analogizing “individual” to “person.” Under
an expressio unius est exclusio alterius analysis, Mohamad
further contends that Congress did not mean to limit liability to
“natural persons.” Mohamad also analogizes the Torture Victim
Protection Act to international documents establishing liability
for similar crimes; specifically, these treaties do not concentrate liability to natural persons. Finally, Mohamad looks to
legislative history and concludes that Congress intended to use
the word “individual” to preclude foreign states from liability.
Therefore, Mohamad argues custom should broaden torture
violations under the Torture Victim Protection Act to include
organizations.
The PA, in contrast, argues for a strict interpretation of
the statute. Specifically, “[d]ictionaries, common usage, case
law, and statutes all make clear that the ordinary meaning of ‘individuals’ is a natural person or human being.” The respondent
rebuts Mohamad’s contention that “person” and “individual”
are similar. Finally, the PA also looks at Congressional intent and concludes that Congress carefully used “individual”
because it wanted to limit liability to natural persons.
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SOUTHERN UNION COMPANY
V. UNITED STATES
Docket Number: 11-94
Argument: March 19, 2012
Issue:
Whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendment principles that the
Supreme Court established in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466 (2000) (concluding that a jury must find a fact that increases
a prison sentence beyond the otherwise applicable statutory
maximum) apply to criminal fines.
Facts:
Southern Union (SU), a gas company, violated a federal
statute for storing mercury without a permit. After a mercury
spill, SU tried to mitigate damages with surrounding residents.
A jury found SU guilty and at sentencing SU was fined $50,000
for each day of the violation; this amounted to millions. SU
objected to this calculation and thought it was inconsistent
under Apprendi because “the jury did not determine the number
of days or duration of the [statute] violation and, therefore,
the maximum sentence supported by the jury’s verdict was
the maximum fine for a one-day violation.” The district court
rejected this argument and held that Apprendi does not apply to
criminal fines. The appellate court rejected SU’s argument as
well and relied on Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 (2009) to hold
Apprendi inapplicable to the facts.
SU’s main argument is that the Court’s reasoning
in Apprendi does not provide an adequate basis to distinguish
between fines and jail time under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendment. Further, the Supreme Court’s historical analysis
and application of Apprendi in United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 (2005), does not explicitly isolate imprisonment
as the sole sentence that requires a jury to find any fact that
increases punishment beyond a statutory maximum. SU also
believes the appellate court erred in relying on Ice because it
“did not involve a criminal fine and is properly understood as
a narrow decision that merely declined to extend the Apprendi
principle to the multiple offense context.” Finally, SU argues
that if Apprendi does not encompass fines, then innocent people
may be forced to plead guilty absent constitutional safeguards
against judicial abuse.
The United States does not advocate extending Apprendi to
criminal fines. Also, the government agrees with the appellate
court’s interpretation of Ice; specifically, the jury does not have
to find any fact when allowing consecutive sentences. Further,
criminal fines are fundamentally different than imprisonment
or capital punishment because fines “involve a deprivation of
property, while [imprisonment or capital punishment involve] a
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deprivation of liberty or life.” As such, the United States argues
that applying Apprendi to fines would undermine the historical
distinction or concern between cash punishment and freedom
while eroding judicial sentencing discretion.

MILLER V. ALABAMA
Docket Number: 10-9646
Argument: March 20, 2012
Issue:
Whether imposing a sentence of life without possibility of
parole on a fourteen-year-old offender who committed capital
murder violates the Eighth Amendment under the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause.
Facts:
Evan Miller was convicted of capital murder for an
offense committed when he was fourteen. He was sentenced
to life-without-parole. The Alabama Circuit Court denied
Miller’s new-trial motion that called for an Eight Amendment
violation because the court allegedly did not consider Miller’s
age or other mitigating circumstances. On appeal, the Alabama
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed because capital murder
justified a life-without-parole sentence regardless of age.
Miller argues that fourteen-year-olds should not be subject
to a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of release
under an Eight Amendment theory. Specifically, the Court’s
holdings in Roper v. Simmons and Graham v. Florida show
that “youth and its attendant features have a critical role to play
in determining an adolescent’s culpability.” Therefore, Miller
relies mostly on policy considerations and Supreme Court
precedent to assert that age should play a bigger role in lifewithout-parole jurisprudence.
Alabama believes that the Eight Amendment allows lifewithout-parole sentences to be imposed on murderers under
eighteen. Alabama also relies on statutory analysis across
multiple jurisdictions in the United States to assert that most
states allow life-without-parole sentences for aggravated murder
when the offender was fourteen. The state also rebuts Miller’s
argument about the rarity of said sentences because “it is only
a very few fourteen-year-olds committing aggravated murder.”
Further, Alabama sees the distinction between fourteen and
eighteen-year-olds as a judicial fiction when it comes to scienter, but also recognizes that fourteen-year-olds are exempt from
the death penalty whereas their eighteen-year-old compatriots
are not. Finally, the state also relies on policy considerations
to show that a life-without-parole sentence is appropriate and
comports with the Eighth Amendment.
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VASQUEZ V. UNITED STATES
Docket Number: 11-199
Argument: March 21, 2012
Issues:
(1) Whether the Seventh Circuit violated the harmless
error rule when it focused its harmless error analysis solely on
the weight of the untainted evidence without considering the
potential effect of the error (the erroneous admission of trial
counsel’s statements that his client would lose the case and
should plead guilty for their truth) on the jury. (2) Whether the
Seventh Circuit violated Vasquez’s Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial by determining that Vasquez should have been
convicted without considering the effects of the district court’s
error on the jury that heard the case.
Facts:
Petitioner Alexander Vasquez was charged with conspiracy
to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and attempting to
possess with the intent to distribute cocaine after a monitored
drug transaction where he crashed into a police car and was
found at a McDonalds. A government witness testified that
Vasquez was not supposed to be there. Also, the government
introduced evidence of a prior cocaine conviction for Vasquez
of which his role was not duplicated in the case at hand. In
addition, the government used recordings to show that
Vasquez’s lawyer said that “everyone is going to lose at trial
and that [Vasquez] should plead guilty.” The statements were
heard four times and the jury convicted after eight hours of
deliberation. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit agreed that the
recordings should not have been allowed in, but deemed it a
harmless error and affirmed the conviction. The Seventh Circuit
reasoned that there was enough evidence to convict otherwise.
Petitioner Vasquez asks the Supreme Court to reconsider
the appellate court’s harmless-error analysis. Specifically,
the analysis should “require consideration of an error’s effect
in the context of the entire record.” Further, Vasquez argues
that the error heavily influenced the jury’s decision to convict.
As such, the Court should not focus on “overwhelming independent evidence” because it undermines the policy governing
harmless-error jurisprudence and violates the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial. Therefore, Vazquez contends that a judge
makes a guilt determination when he/she only asks if there was
enough independent evidence to convict and allows prejudicial
evidence into the record erroneously.
The United States agrees with the Seventh Circuit in that
the court “appropriately articulated the harmless-error standard
and correctly concluded based on its review of the ‘evidence as
a whole’ that the non-constitutional trial error did not alter the
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verdict.” Further, the government argues that the appellate court
complied with the standard and independently determined that
there was a “fair assurance” that the jury’s decision would not
have been different had the error not been made. The government also disagrees with Vasquez’s Sixth Amendment claim
because it was the jury who convicted him in the first place.
Thus, the United States concludes that the Seventh Circuit’s
application of the harmless-error standard was objective and the
erroneous admission of evidence was harmless because the case
would not have been decided differently.

REICHLE V. HOWARDS
Docket Number: 11-262
Argument: March 21, 2012
Issues:
(1) Whether probable cause to make an arrest bars a First
Amendment retaliatory arrest claim. (2) Whether the court
below erred by denying qualified and absolute immunity to
petitioners where probable cause existed for respondent’s arrest, the arrest comported with the Fourth Amendment, and the
denial of immunity threatens to interfere with the split-second,
life-or-death decisions of Secret Service agents protecting the
President and Vice President.
Facts:
On June 16, 2006, respondent Howards walked through
an outdoor shopping center to take his son to a piano recital.
He saw Vice President Dick Cheney shaking hands and taking
pictures with patrons. Secret Service Agent Doyle protected
Vice President Cheney that day and heard Howards say, “I’m
going to ask [Cheney] how many kids he’s killed today.” Agent
Doyle also saw an opaque bag in Howards’ hands. Howards
approached the Vice President, exchanged a few words, touched
Cheney’s right shoulder with his open hand, and walked away.
Protective Intelligence Coordinator Agent Reichle was called
to investigate the incident and determined there was probable
cause to arrest Howards. Howards was detained for a few hours
at the Eagle County Sheriff’s Department, but state charges
were eventually dropped and no federal charges were filed.
Howards sued Agents Reichle and Doyle under § 1983
alleging First and Fourth Amendment violations. The district
court denied the Agents’ motion for summary judgment. The
Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court
rejected the Fourth Amendment claim on the idea that the
Agents had probable cause to arrest. However, the court held
that probable cause was not a bar to Howard’s First Amendment
retaliation claim.
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The Agents argue that the First Amendment claim should
be barred under an extension of Hartman v. Moore; here, the
Supreme Court barred retaliatory prosecution claims where probable cause supports the prosecution. Further, the Agents argue
that they should have flexibility in arresting people who can
cause potential harm to the President without hesitation. Also,
the Agents beseech the Court to protect them under qualified immunity. Therefore, the Agents want the probable cause standard
to bar retaliatory arrest claims against the Secret Service.
In contrast, Howards argues that a First Amendment
retaliatory arrest suit should lie “regardless of whether the arresting officer possessed probable cause to make an arrest when that
officer was actually motivated by personal animus toward the
protected speech.” Further, Howards does not want the Agents’
qualified immunity to be transferred into absolute immunity
because probable cause itself should not legalize a retaliatory
prosecution. Ultimately, Howards does not think that probable
cause should bar a First Amendment retaliation arrest suit.

DORSEY V. UNITED STATES / HILL V.
UNITED STATES
Docket Number: 11-5683 (Dorsey); 11-5721 (Hill)
Argument: April 17, 2012
Issue:
Whether the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 applies in an
initial sentencing preceding that takes place on or after the
statute’s effective date if the offense occurred before that date.
Facts:
The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) reduced the disparity between crack and powdered cocaine necessary to trigger
possible United States criminal penalties while eliminating
a five-year mandatory minimum sentence for crack cocaine
possession. The Dorsey v. United States and Hill v. United
States litigations were consolidated. In August 2008, Dorsey
was arrested in Illinois and charged with possession with intent
to distribute five or more grams of cocaine base. Petitioner
Dorsey admitted to possessing 5.5 grams of crack cocaine.
He asked for an FSA sentence on this and prior felony drug
convictions but the district court rejected his argument. The
appellate court affirmed the judgment below because it did not
interpret the FSA as a law that applies retroactively.
In March 2007, petitioner Hill sold around 53.3 grams of
crack cocaine to an informant. He was charged and convicted
with distributing fifty grams or more of cocaine base. He was
sentenced to 120 months in jail even though the mandatory
minimum for his offense would have been five years had the
FSA been retroactively applied. The appellate court affirmed
under similar reasoning in Dorsey.
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Petitioners under Dorsey and Hill argue that Congress
intended the FSA to apply retroactively and the language in the
statute reflected that aim. Accordingly, “it would make little
sense to require the [Sentencing] Commission to incorporate
the [new] ratio into emergency Guidelines if the pre-FSA
mandatory minimums would remain ‘applicable law’ for the
thousands of pre-enactment offenders who would be sentenced
under those emergency guidelines.” Petitioners then looked at
legislative history to show that if Congress intended the FSA to
take effect post-enactment, then an earlier version with similar
wording would not have been scratched. Finally, Dorsey and
Hill argue that the purpose of the FSA was to ensure fairness
in cocaine sentencing and not applying it retroactively would
halter that goal.
The United States argues that Section 109 of the U.S.
Code forbids retroactivity because the FSA does not expressly
endorse such an application. The government thus does not find
any justification to apply the FSA retroactively under the four
corners of the statute. Finally, the United States disputes the
petitioner’s fairness argument by arguing that “Congress never
avowedly changes sentencing practices to make them less fair;
yet the general rule . . . in Section 109 precludes retroactive
application of those changes in the mine run of cases.” Therefore,
the United States asserts a prospective application of the FSA.

ARIZONA V. UNITED STATES
Docket Number: 11-182
Argument: April 25, 2012
Issue:
Whether federal immigration laws preclude Arizona’s
efforts at cooperative law enforcement and impliedly preempt
four provisions of S.B. 1070 (state law authorizing and directing law enforcement officers to cooperate and communicate
with federal officials regarding the enforcement of federal
immigration law and imposing penalties for non-compliance
with federal immigration requirements) facially.
Facts:
Arizona enacted a state law (S.B. 1070) meant to help
authorize and direct state law enforcement officers to cooperate
and talk to federal officials about enforcing federal immigration
laws. The United States filed suit to enjoin four provisions of the
law that allegedly federal law preempts. The district court held
that federal immigration law preempted said four provisions and
the appellate court affirmed.
The government argues that they alone have jurisdiction
over immigration issues. Further, the Supreme Court in Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), “established that Congress had
left no room for the States to adopt their own rival registration
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rules. Section 3 of S.B. 1070 fails under that holding.” As such,
it is up to Congress and the federal government to deal with
immigration issues while not permitting Arizona to create its
own immigration policy. Therefore, the United States beseeches
the Supreme Court to render the Arizona law unconstitutional.
Arizona, however, sees no clear conflict between S.B. 1070
and federal law. Further, the state rejects the idea that it’s creating its own immigration policy. Ultimately, Arizona sees itself
as a state that suffers from disproportionate impact because of
illegal immigration. Therefore, Arizona seeks to strike a balance
between creating its immigration policy and being “impliedly
stripped of its plenary authority and at the mercy of the federal
executive’s lax enforcement policy.” Thus, Arizona seeks to
have the four provisions previously enjoined upheld.
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